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Abstract 
 
Specialised committees form an important part of the policy-making 
process in the European Union. After the 2004 enlargement of the 
EU, the institutional setup of these committees and the practice of 
‘committee governance’ have been considerably challenged. The 
Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) is a mode of governance in 
which the work of expert committees is essential. Open and 
consensus-oriented discussions in committee meetings are regarded 
as a precondition of the success of the OMC and as a basis of its 
legitimacy. However, with ten new member states joining OMC 
committees, the institutional conditions of discussions change. This 
article provides a discursive conceptual framework for analysing 
the undergoing changes, and applies it to the case of the Social 
Protection Committee. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Specialised committees form an important part of the policy-making 
process in the European Union. After the 2004 enlargement of the 
EU and the inclusion of ten new member states, the institutional 
setup of these committees and the practice of ‘committee 
governance’ have been considerably challenged. The Open Method 
of Co-ordination (OMC) is a new mode of governance in which 
expert committees play an essential role. This article focuses on the 
institutionalisation of the committee phase of the OMC after the 
enlargement of the EU, examining specifically the Social Protection 
Committee (SPC). 
 
The institutional framework of the OMC has been designed so that 
committees become ‘discursive communities’ (Schmidt 2002: 247), 
in which member state representatives discuss and deliberate about 
common normative frameworks, guidelines and opinions in specific 
policy areas. Thus, committees are the main fora for policy co-
ordination among member state representatives. This process is said 
to be the basis of both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the 
OMC (Mosher and Trubek 2003, Zeitlin 2005). As the strategy 
relies on the self-commitment of member states, it is usually argued 
that if discussions of member state representatives are not 
consensus-oriented, policy learning is less likely to occur (Puetter 
2006). In other words, if there are no substantial discussions with 
the involvement of all participants, the OMC is neither legitimate 
nor successful. Enlargement can be pictured as a cause of potential 
problems in this respect for many reasons. For example, one might 
argue that due to the lack of socialisation of actors from new 
member states (see Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002), or 
because of the increasing diversity of policy positions (Scharpf 
2002), it becomes more difficult or impossible to reach a consensus. 
 
Therefore, it is essential to analyse whether enlargement can 
transform this procedural aspect of the OMC, and if yes, in what 
ways. Most authors emphasise that successful discussions require 
certain institutional conditions (Risse 2000, Hemerijck 2004). 
Consequently, there is a need to study whether and how these 
conditions changed after the enlargement of the EU. In order to do 
so, this article develops a discursive conceptual framework for Anna Horváth: Social Protection Committee  55 
analysing the potential impacts of enlargement on the committee 
phase of the OMC. The analysis will focus on the 
institutionalisation of the work of committees through the case 
study of the SPC. 
 
The structure of the article is the following. First, the institutional 
setup of the OMC and the role of the SPC are briefly presented. 
Second, the conceptual framework of the analysis is outlined. The 
framework centres on the discursive, inter-subjective 
institutionalisation of new governance arrangements. The article 
then turns to the empirical analysis, thus to the case study of the 
SPC. Attention is paid to the organisation of interaction within the 
SPC after the enlargement and to the role perception, normative 
commitment and relationships of its members. The analysis has to 
reveal the potential differences between old and new actors in these 
respects. The final section presents the conclusions. 
 
 
2.  The Open Method of Co-ordination 
 
The OMC was officially launched in 2000 at the Lisbon European 
Council (European Council 2000a) in order to define the new mode 
of governance that emerged with the already existing Broad 
Economic Policy Guidelines and the European Employment 
Strategy. Later on, the OMC was also introduced in other areas, 
most importantly in connection with social inclusion, pensions, and 
health care. These issues make up the so-called streamlined social 
protection and social inclusion agenda. This new method is said to 
help reaching the overarching goal of the Lisbon strategy: 
 
‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy 
in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better 
jobs and greater social cohesion’ (European Council 2000a). 
 
In addition, the OMC also forms part of the project of 
democratising EU decision-making through participatory 
governance (De la Porte and Nanz 2004). The involvement of 
‘social partners and civil society’ in the coordination process ‘using 
variable forms of partnership’ is one of the main promises of the 
method (European Council 2000a). Furthermore, the normative 56  European Political Economy Review  
   
anchoring of the OMC is also in its ‘openness’ and ‘flexibility’, its 
focus on ‘cooperation’, and its ability to promote ‘learning’ and 
‘greater convergence  towards the main EU goals’ (European 
Commission 2003: 8-10). At the same time, the OMC allows the 
EU and its member states to respect ‘diversity’ and the principle of 
‘subsidiarity’ (European Commission 2003: 10). 
 
The European Commission’s White Paper on European Governance 
describes the OMC the following way: 
 
‘The open method of co-ordination … is a way of encouraging co-
operation, the exchange of best practice and agreeing common targets and 
guidelines for Member States, sometimes backed up by national action 
plans as in the case of employment and social exclusion. It relies on 
regular monitoring of progress to meet those targets, allowing Member 
States to compare their efforts and learn from the experience of others’ 
(European Commission 2001: 21, emphasis added). 
 
The institutional setup of the OMC has been designed to help 
reaching these goals of ‘learning’ and ‘convergence’. As Frank 
Vandenbroucke (2002: 9) noted when he was the Minister for 
Social Affairs and Pensions of the Belgian Federal Government: 
 
‘the open method of co-ordination is both a cognitive and a normative tool. 
It is a ‘cognitive’ tool, because it allows us to learn from each other. In my 
opinion, this learning process is not restricted to the practice of other 
Member States, but also extends to their underlying views and opinions, 
an area that is no less important. Open co-ordination is a ‘normative’ tool 
because, necessarily, common objectives embody substantive views on 
social justice. Thus open co-ordination gradually creates a European social 
policy paradigm’. 
 
The co-ordination process within the OMC relies on ‘administrative 
networks’ which consist of various experts and public officials who 
continuously and repeatedly co-ordinate their actions, ‘interact and 
exchange ideas and experiences’ in several fora, and ‘exert peer 
pressure on one another’ (Borrás and Jacobsson 2004: 196). The 
establishment of fora for discussion, the most important of which 
are expert committees
1  that meet regularly, serves to enhance a 
‘(self-)reflective debate’ (Cohen and Sabel 2003: 346). 
                                                 
1 In the cases of social inclusion, pensions and health care (streamlined social 
protection and social inclusion) the main responsible committee is the Social Anna Horváth: Social Protection Committee  57 
 
The goal of committee discussions is to reach consensual decisions 
in areas where policy positions differ considerably, without any 
voting procedure, with every participant (representatives of every 
member state of the EU) ready for compromises and to accept the 
position of others. However, these consensual decisions are not 
binding for member states in any formal sense. Therefore, as 
Jacobsson (2004: 359) put it: 
 
‘a key issue is how formally non-binding agreements can gradually 
become politically, socially and morally binding for the actors involved’. 
 
Jacobsson (2004: 356) conceptualises the mechanisms through 
which this becomes possible as being ‘discursive regulatory 
mechanisms’. She argues that these mechanisms can only work if 
member states are ‘committed to the cooperation procedures’ 
(Jacobsson 2004: 366). This commitment was taken for granted 
before the enlargement. However, this cannot be so 
straightforwardly assumed in the case of new member states. 
 
2.1 The Social Protection Committee 
 
Social protection and social inclusion are among those policy areas 
where definitions of policy problems and ideas about potential 
solutions are the most diverse, debated and contested. There is no 
clear ‘vision’ about how policies combating social exclusion should 
look like that is shared among the member states (de la Porte and 
Pochet 2002). Furthermore, social protection and social inclusion 
are ‘politically highly sensitive’ policy areas where the competence 
of the EU has always been questioned (Kröger 2006: 1). Therefore, 
it is particularly important to study the SPC that is responsible for 
the streamlined social protection and social inclusion process. 
While this committee faces many difficulties in agreeing on 
problem definitions and policy solutions, it is also under pressure to 
reach consensual decisions in order to give visibility to social issues 
and to justify its existence. 
 
                                                                                                               
Protection Committee (SPC), for the European Employment Strategy it is the 
Employment Committee (EMCO), and for economic policy co-ordination it is 
the Economic Policy Committee (EPC). 58  European Political Economy Review  
   
The SPC was established in 2000 (Council of the European Union 
2000; re-established by Council of the European Union 2004), after 
the Nice European Council launched the Social Inclusion Process 
(European Council 2000b). The SPC has four broad objectives: 
 
‘to make work pay and provide secure income, to make pensions safe and 
pension systems sustainable, to promote social inclusion and to ensure 
high quality and sustainable health care’ (Council of the European Union 
2004). 
 
The main tasks of the SPC – which has an advisory status – are the 
following (see Council of the European Union 2004): 
 
(1)  ‘to monitor the social situation and the development of social 
protection policies in the Member States and the Community’; 
(2)  ‘to promote the exchanges of information, experience and good 
practice between Member States and with the Commission’; and 
(3)  ‘to prepare reports, formulate opinions or undertake other work 
within its fields of competence, at the request of either the 
Council or the Commission or on its own initiative’. 
 
Since the Treaty of Nice, these tasks are also listed in the EC Treaty 
(Article 144).  
 
Members of the SPC are representatives from the member states – 
in principle, two delegates from national ministries with two 
alternates if the member state is able to send this many people – and 
two representatives of the European Commission. The committee 
elects its chairperson from among the representatives for two years, 
which term is non-renewable. The chair is responsible for setting 
the agenda for SPC meetings. This person is assisted by a ‘bureau’ 
that consists of Commission representatives and four vice-
chairpersons, two of whom are elected for two years, one is from 
the country holding the Presidency of the Council, and one is from 
the country of the following Presidency. The European Commission 
appoints a so-called secretary of the committee and provides 
organisational support for the SPC (Council of the European Union 
2004). The committee also established an Indicators’ Sub-Group 
that is responsible for the development of indicators and for 
providing statistical support. 
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3. Conceptual  framework 
 
The discursive conceptual framework of this article is developed to 
analyse the institutionalisation process of new governance 
arrangements such as the OMC. It focuses on the ways in which the 
actors involved in such governance processes perceive, enact, and 
make sense of them. As enlargement means that new actors started 
to be actively involved in co-ordination and policy-making 
processes in OMC committees, this framework is especially useful 
to examine the institutionalisation of committee governance in this 
period. 
 
Within this framework,  
 
‘discourse serves to explain political events, to legitimate political actions, 
to develop political identities, to reshape and/or reinterpret political history 
and, all in all, to frame the … political discussion’ (Schmidt and Radaelli 
2004: 202-203). 
 
Institutions influence who can be an important actor in these 
discussions; when, how and where. Furthermore, discourse also 
legitimates and interprets institutional arrangements. This 
interpretation process concerns the normative basis of institutional 
design and the different roles played by relevant actors within 
specific governance structures. 
 
Paying attention to how actors enact and interpret institutional 
norms is especially crucial in the case of ‘institutional ambiguity’ 
(Hajer 2006, Hajer and Versteeg 2005). In this context, 
 
‘there is no single “constitution” that pre-determines where and how a 
legitimate decision is to be taken. Actors bring their own assumptions 
about rules and authority. Consequently, the policy process itself becomes 
the site at which rules need to be negotiated’ (Hajer 2006: 43). 
 
This implies that this negotiation process itself is crucial in bringing 
about shared notions of rules, authority, and legitimacy. The 
participation of actors within an institutional context shape and 
construct that context but at the same time, the experience of 
cooperation transforms the actors themselves (Hajer and Versteeg 
2005, Olsen 2000). A concept that helps the analysis of this inter-
subjective construction of institutions and participants is 60  European Political Economy Review  
   
‘performance’ (Hajer 2006, Hajer and Versteeg 2005). If one 
assumes that discourses are speech acts, then the ‘contextualised 
interaction itself is seen as producing social realities’ (Hajer and 
Versteeg 2005: 345). 
 
The case of committees within the OMC represent an interesting 
case of institutional ambiguity, especially after the enlargement, as 
new actors have had only vague ideas about how policy 
coordination was working. As one committee representative from a 
new member state described: 
 
‘The problem is that we got on when the committee was running and no-
one really explained to us what is the role of the committee and how it 
functions (…), it was more or less learning by doing’ (Interviewee no. 6). 
 
Although there are pre-defined rules that structure action – as it was 
shown in the discussion of the OMC above – actors are mainly left 
alone to work out their own rules and sources of authority. 
Committee discussions can be regarded as performances, during 
which actors (committee members) enact and communicate the 
normative basis of their institutional setting (consensus and 
cooperation). Through discursive practices they construct 
themselves as participants (Hajer 2006). 
 
Performing policy processes within certain institutional contexts 
brings about ‘living institutions’ (Olsen 2000) through the process 
of institutionalisation (Olsen 1997). When actors start to enact and 
interpret certain organisational rules and norms and they do so in a 
more and more regular way, the process of institutionalisation starts. 
The present analysis focuses on two main dimensions of 
institutionalisation as defined by Olsen (1997: 213): first, the 
‘structuralization and routinization of behavior’, and second, 
‘linking resources to values and world-views’.
2  
                                                 
2   There is a third element of institutionalisation in Olsen’s framework, 
‘standardization, homogenization and authorization of codes of meaning and 
ways of reasoning’ (Olsen 1997: 213), which is not discussed here. It is 
certainly a crucial element from a discursive perspective; however, it can 
partly be set aside when one aims to analyse changes in the organisation of 
and commitment to decision-making procedures. Nevertheless, it is in part 
taken into account under the heading of the other two elements of 
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According to Olsen (1997: 213), the first element of 
institutionalisation is the ‘structuralization and routinization of 
behavior’ within governance structures. Within the present 
framework, this behaviour should be interpreted as the mode of 
interaction: the way of discussing, communicating and interpreting 
issues. Modes of interaction or ‘requirements of communication’ 
(March and Olsen 1995: 175) become conventionalised, well-
established and legitimate while adapting to formal and informal 
rules which are less and less contested and directly reflected on. All 
through the institutionalisation process, actors’ continually enact 
and interpret the existing institutional setting itself, but this becomes 
decreasingly visible and evident. As a result of a series of 
discussions and interpretative practices, actors begin to perceive 
their role, the structures they act in and the legitimacy of their 
decisions more and more similarly. 
 
The other element of institutionalisation in Olsen’s framework is 
‘linking resources to values and world-views’, which means that 
 
‘resource mobilization and principles of resource allocations are 
routinized’ (Olsen 1997: 213). 
 
Within the framework presented here these resources or capabilities 
are conceptualised to be inter-subjective as well: they are dependent 
on the perceptions and interpretations of actors that evolve through 
discursive practices. Individual capabilities and resources are 
context-dependent, so are power and authority. Modes of interaction 
also require and facilitate certain distributions of power. For 
example, in a coordinative setting, power is typically interpreted as 
being ‘dispersed’ (Schmidt 2002: 239); thus, participants tend to 
perceive each other more as equals. The institutionalisation of 
governance structures strengthens these perceptions and routinises 
modes of resource mobilisation; but again, this process does not 
prevent their repeated reinterpretation. 
 
After the 2004 enlargement, one can identify several factors 
influencing or disrupting the ongoing routinisation of behaviour and 
the mobilisation of resources within the context of OMC 
committees. For example, these factors can be: the increasing 62  European Political Economy Review  
   
number of committee representatives; the professional background 
and relationship of committee members; or specific organisational 
practices that can reflect power relations among old and new actors. 
Certainly, these perceived relations influence the nature of 
discussions within the SPC: if members do not regard each other as 
equals, discussions cannot be regarded as honest, and participation 
is not effective in the case of all representatives. 
 
Furthermore, in order to study the individual commitment of actors 
to cooperation procedures, it is essential to see how the institutional 
setting is perceived, communicated and performed, and how modes 
of interaction and their routinisation shape the role perception and 
normative standpoints of actors (see also Egeberg 1999). Without 
the support and commitment of new member states – in other words, 
without committee representatives being socialised into the OMC – 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the OMC can weaken. Thus, 
committee discussions can only be successful if committee 
members themselves acknowledge
3 that cooperation and consensus 
are the appropriate and ‘the legitimate ways of reaching decisions’ 
(Egeberg 1999: 460, emphasis original). 
 
As it was introduced in the discussion about the OMC, this article 
regards cooperation among actors in the form of open, inclusive and 
consensual discussions as the main (procedural) normative bases of 
the design of OMC committees, as these are the most prevalent in 
both academic and European policy discourses. Thus, the analysis 
has to reveal how actors’ interactions and discourses are organised 
around the theme of consensus and cooperation, and how the setting 
of OMC committees is performed and become institutionalised as 
consensual and cooperative. It is important to note here, 
nevertheless, that the analysis does not seek to provide explanations 
for why certain actors perform their roles in certain ways; it only 
discusses how participants construct their own role and the 
governance arrangements they act in. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Acknowledgement or acceptance does not necessarily mean internalisation. 
It only concerns the actors’ recognition that OMC committees operate in a 
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4.   Case study: the Social Protection Committee 
 
This section of the article discusses some impacts of the 2004 
enlargement on the institutionalisation of the SPC. The analysis 
illustrates how the above presented discursive conceptual 
framework can be used for empirical evaluation, and in particular, 
how changes in committee governance can be assessed. All 
empirical material and citations that are referred to in the next 
section are from semi-structured, anonymous interviews with 
member state representatives of the SPC.
4   The interviews are 
assumed to be discursive actions themselves, as interviewees can 
use them ‘as a political instrument to further their views and goals’ 
(Barbier 2004: 19). This means that the interviews can reveal what 
values the actors communicate and find important as the bases of 
their institutional action. 
 
4.1 Performing consensus: role perceptions and the organisation 
of interaction 
 
The nature of discussions, their interpretation and the commitment 
to common normative standards are the first important phenomena 
to study. If discussions are not open and consensual, or committee 
members do not interpret them this way, the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of OMC committee decisions can weaken. When asked 
about organisational practices after the enlargement, member state 
delegates listed several factors that can disrupt the openness of 
discussions. Most of them referred to changes in the working 
methods of the SPC due to the increased number of delegations. 
Since the SPC has more than fifty members with the inclusion of 
new member states, it has to rely on written procedures (discussions 
through emailing) much more often. Furthermore, there is little 
                                                 
4 The empirical analysis is based on 13 in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
with member state representatives of the SPC and 3 with officials of the 
European Commission who attend SPC meetings regularly. Among the 13 
interviewees from member state administrations 5 is from new member 
countries, 5 has been a member of the SPC since its creation, and 3 is from 
old member states who became representatives after the enlargement. The 
interviews were conducted in the first half of 2006. Interview transcripts were 
numbered randomly, and the interviewees are quoted according to these 
numbers. 64  European Political Economy Review  
   
room for longer discussions in SPC meetings. Therefore, delegates 
are encouraged to make short interventions that are not longer than 
three to four minutes, or not to intervene at all if an opinion was 
already articulated by somebody else. One consequence of this 
limited possibility to intervene is that those with less experience in 
attending such meetings are less likely to participate actively. This 
applies mostly to delegates from new member states. A further 
problem, as it was pointed out by some of the delegates, is a more 
extensive reliance on using interpretation services instead of 
speaking only in English or French, which makes interactions 
longer and more complicated. Certainly, with these informal rules 
and language difficulties in place, substantial discussions become 
more difficult to reach. 
 
Some delegates mentioned another organisational factor that 
influences discussions. There is a high turnover rate in SPC 
membership in the case of some member states, especially the new 
and small ones. There are two main reasons for this phenomenon. 
First, there are often different experts in the national administrations 
responsible for the different topics discussed by the SPC. Second, 
new member states could not always find delegates who could stay 
in the committee for a longer period of time. As a result of the 
partly changing membership of the SPC, delegates ‘do not know 
each other that well’ (Interviewee no. 2) to discuss issues in an 
informal manner. Furthermore, new delegates do not always 
appreciate – or simply know about – previous agreements, which 
can hinder further discussions. 
 
Nevertheless, interviews show that most member state delegates 
regard the SPC as a ‘valuable forum for exchanging opinions’ 
(Interviewee no. 6), regardless of the scepticism expressed by some 
of them about the working methods or the difficulties in having in-
depth discussions. They emphasised the importance of exchanging 
information and argued that the SPC allows member states to ‘learn 
from each other’ (Interviewee no. 9). Delegates highlighted that the 
OMC is a ‘consensual process’ (Interviewee no. 9), a ‘dialogue’ 
(Interviewee no. 6) that is built on cooperation among member 
states, and in which disagreements are resolved by in-depth, 
‘ongoing discussions’ (Interviewee no. 7). In this process, it is 
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‘compromise’ at the end of all debates (almost all interviewees 
mentioned these terms), and to come up with a position that is 
‘commonly shared’ by all the representatives. These ‘common 
opinions’ were seen as the main determinants of the success of the 
SPC (e.g. Interviewee no. 7). Some delegates also emphasised the 
importance of developing common indicators, as common 
definitions and understandings were not available before. The 
general atmosphere of the meetings is described to be ‘friendly’ (e.g. 
Interviewee no. 6), where all representatives are equals. 
 
However, there are some observable differences between old and 
new members of the SPC – whereas the term new delegates here 
encompasses delegates from both old and new member states. 
Those who have been representatives for less than two years (i.e. 
became delegates after the 2004 enlargement) tend to be much more 
critical about the working of the committee, and they refer to 
keywords such as consensus, cooperation or common values less 
often. This is especially true for new delegates from old member 
states, who tend to talk less about the abstract principles on which 
the OMC or the SPC rest. They seem to be less attached to the SPC 
and emphasise instead much more their loyalty to their respective 
government or ministry.
5  In the answers of new delegates, the 
European Commission or the European Union in general often 
appears to be something outside or even against the member states. 
For example, one delegate descried the Commission as a ‘tank’ that 
can even override member states in order to achieve its goals 
(Interviewee no. 4). 
 
Furthermore, answers of new representatives reflect the 
socialisation process of the SPC more explicitly, referring to 
statements of the chair or representatives of the European 
Commission about the importance and the consensual nature of 
discussions. Thus, in these cases, normative principles appear as 
phrases mentioned by someone else – even if this someone else is 
                                                 
5   About ‘representational ambiguity’ and its analysis see Trondal and 
Veggeland (2003). One form of role ambiguity can be well illustrated with 
one statement of a committee representative: ‘It is a little bit difficult for me 
to get into this mentality, because I am a technocrat, I am not a politician; but 
gradually, you understand’ (Interviewee no. 5). 66  European Political Economy Review  
   
an authoritative member of the committee. One delegate from a new 
member state, for example, referred repeatedly to statements of the 
chair of the SPC and their impact on her thinking: 
 
‘The Social Protection Committee, as [the chair] said himself, is a political 
thing, and you are looking for a compromise’ (Interviewee no. 5), 
 
or 
 
‘When there was a conflict … [the chair] explained to us that this is 
different from other meetings, this is a political meeting as well’ 
(Interviewee no. 5). 
 
From these quotations it also seems clear that the chair of the SPC 
plays an important role in making the delegates understand what the 
main values of the committee are and in formulating their 
commitment to the SPC and to the OMC as an institution. 
 
4.2 Authority and resource mobilization: equal participation in 
cooperation? 
 
Relationships between actors and power distributions can influence 
the effective participation of committee representatives. Therefore, 
it is essential to study how resources are perceived to be distributed 
within the SPC. Although all interviewees claimed that everyone 
has the same right to participate, most of them acknowledged that 
opportunities and competencies differ. The main individual resource 
mentioned by delegates is ‘expertise’ (e.g. Interviewee no. 2) or 
‘knowledge’ (Interviewee no. 6). When asked directly, most of 
them refused the presumption that new member state delegates do 
not have as much expertise as those from old member states (there 
were some exceptions, see in connection with recruitment). 
However, it was acknowledged by some that those who have been 
involved in policy issues related to social protection and social 
inclusion for a longer time are more ‘listened to’ (Interviewee no. 2). 
If there is any country grouping mentioned in this regard, then it is 
the distinction between large and small member states. Here the 
main argument is that small member states have fewer resources; 
therefore, they are not able to send their best experts to SPC 
meetings, or sometimes they are not able to send anybody at all. Anna Horváth: Social Protection Committee  67 
This certainly hinders their effective participation in committee 
meetings. 
 
Besides expertise, three more sources of respect were mentioned in 
the interviews: size of the country of the delegate, the ability to 
reach a compromise, and neutrality (opinion independent from the 
official position of a member state). These latter two are particularly 
interesting, especially considering the fact that all delegates are 
claimed to be primarily member state representatives who are 
bound by the official position of their ministers. Bringing up 
neutrality, therefore, points to the direction of a normative 
orientation towards consensus-oriented, substantive discussions 
about common concerns. 
 
Neutrality can be especially achieved by those who have formal 
positions within the SPC: the respective chairpersons of the SPC 
and the Indicators’ Sub-Group, and the vice-chairs of the SPC 
(Interviewee no. 10). The chairs are usually not bound by their 
national governments, as their main role is to help finding 
consensual solutions. It is the chairperson who defines the agenda 
of the SPC meetings consulting the secretary, with the Commission 
having a right of initiative, which is discussed by the bureau the 
night before the meeting. Presently, one of the vice-chairs is from a 
new member state. The chairperson can also make a ruling if 
member state representatives cannot achieve consensus in certain 
areas. Furthermore, as it was shown above, the chairperson plays an 
active role in making delegates learn and understand their role as 
members of the SPC. 
 
Recruitment is one aspect in which some representatives from new 
member states observed a difference between old and new members. 
SPC representatives from the old member states are in general 
senior public servants, while those who come from new member 
states are usually younger and less influential. As one delegate from 
a new member state explained, senior officials tend not to come to 
meetings because they do not speak the working languages of the 
SPC (i.e. English or French) and would have problems without 
interpretation services, which are not always available for every 
country. This lack of senior representatives is observed to be a 
problem for two main reasons. First, senior officials are usually 68  European Political Economy Review  
   
more experienced and have more expertise in a given policy area. 
Second, without senior representatives, ‘there is not enough support 
from the minister’ (Interviewee no. 8). Both because of their 
expertise and status, senior officials would have the opportunity to 
‘talk more freely’ and they would be ‘more flexible in making 
decisions in the meetings’ (Interviewee no. 8). Junior members have 
to consult their colleagues back in their ministries more often. This 
happens many times only after the committee meeting itself, which 
makes it impossible for these members to contribute effectively. 
 
Finally, ‘discourse coalitions’ (Hajer 2003) are said to be based on 
similar policy traditions in member states and can vary from issue 
to issue, as it was perceived by some member state delegates. 
Others see these alliances as more stable along ideological lines. 
There seems to be two main groups of countries who differ in the 
way they define the role of social policy (e.g. the UK and the 
Netherlands on the one hand, France, Belgium and Luxembourg on 
the other hand). New member states mostly joined these groupings. 
However, enlargement altered the balance of power in member state 
positions; it is especially the United Kingdom that is seen to have 
gained more allies from among the new member states. 
Nevertheless, all delegates agreed that there are no discourse 
coalitions based on an old-new member state distinction. Delegates 
from new members states feel that they are part of these alliances 
and are involved in the discussions. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This article aimed to provide an assessment of the impacts of the 
2004 enlargement on the institutionalisation of committee 
governance within the OMC based on a discursive conceptual 
framework. It argued that in a context of institutional ambiguity that 
increased after the enlargement, it is essential to study how 
participants perform and commit themselves to coordination 
procedures. The case study of the SPC showed that enlargement has 
influenced the institutionalisation of committee discussions as it is 
perceived to have an impact, first, on the organisation of 
interactions, second, on the role perceptions and normative Anna Horváth: Social Protection Committee  69 
commitments of actors, and finally on the routinisation of resource 
mobilization and the relationships of participants. 
 
Certainly, this article does not want to suggest anything about how 
the SPC worked before the enlargement. Though the 
institutionalisation of the OMC has been going on since its creation, 
enlargement represents an important moment in this process. 
Enlargement has challenged several features of the initial 
institutional setting of OMC committees and changed the 
experience of cooperation. The changing rules and values that are 
listed in this article are perceived to be important by the actors 
themselves. The details of the institutional context discussed here 
show how participants in the SPC (re)construct their institution vis-
à-vis such momentums as the enlargement. Member state delegates 
perform and transform their role in light of the perceived changes – 
and communicate it to the outsider. 
 
As the discussion in the previous section showed, enlargement 
influenced the institutional setup of the SPC as it changed the 
organisation of meetings, mainly due to the large number and 
turnover of representatives. SPC meetings are in many respects not 
regarded as fora for substantial and inclusive discussions. Delegates 
noted that there is no time to give the floor to everyone to talk, and 
many opinions are presented only later in writing. Meetings become 
more and more formal, while written procedures gain importance. 
These changes also strengthen the increasing inequality of 
committee members. Representatives are not perceived to be equals 
in their expertise, seniority and experience. All these factors make it 
difficult to create commitments towards common goals and the 
procedures themselves. 
 
Furthermore, after the enlargement, the number of delegates who 
had not been socialised into the work of the SPC grew considerably. 
Not only new member states got involved in the process, but also 
some representatives from the old member states changed. This is 
partly due to the fact that more and more issues are discussed in 
SPC meetings, which require the involvement of new experts. 
These new delegates are still in the process of learning how the SPC 
works and based on what kind of values; therefore, they act upon 
and perform these values to a much lesser extent. However, 70  European Political Economy Review  
   
interviews showed that – contrary to expectations – it is not the 
representatives from new member states who are the least likely to 
accept, communicate and commit themselves to procedures of 
cooperation. New delegates from old member states show less 
willingness to learn to participate and are much more sceptical 
about common concerns. 
 
Thus, enlargement seems to have influenced the inter-subjective 
institutionalisation of committee meetings, which can be seen 
especially from how representatives described and reconstructed the 
consensual and equal nature of meetings of the SPC. However, the 
impacts of enlargement on the self-identification of member state 
delegates is less clear. On the one hand, old representatives from 
old member states have not become more sceptical about the 
success of the OMC and still see consensus and cooperation as an 
essential part of it. On the other hand, while new delegates do not 
question the basic normative principles of meetings and the whole 
coordination process, they tend to be more critical about them and 
do not participate fully in performing and communicating the OMC 
as a consensual process. The question that remains is whether these 
new representatives are going to be socialised into the SPC, or the 
changing institutional setting will influence their perceptions about 
the nature of the OMC. 
 
Undoubtedly, these changes have consequences for the practice of 
committee governance in general. The case of the SPC has been 
interesting to study because of the particularly ambiguous and 
contested character of its institutional setup. At the same time, there 
are several other type of committees that differ in their organisation, 
tasks and bases of legitimation. Nevertheless, the institutional 
setting has probably been challenged in the case of all committees, 
which can result in changing working methods and role perceptions 
of their actors. Further comparative studies can reveal how these 
changes influence socialisation processes and the performance of 
actors within committee governance in the EU. 
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